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Modigliani and Miller (1958) undermined enthusiasm about the
role of credit in the economy by suggesting that the capital structure
of the firm was mostly irrelevant. Moreover, the strong and robust
correlation between money and real variables found in the empirical
literature of the 1960s provided strong support for the view that the
main transmission mechanism for monetary policy operates through
changes in the cost of capital and their impact on investment (the
interest rate channel).1 In that view, banks were important only be-
cause they created money. In the 1970s, however, the new field of the
economics of information underscored the relevance of capital mar-
ket imperfections and the uniqueness of bank loans against other
forms of debt.2 In this context, the “credit view” emerged as a new
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1. See, for example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
2. The seminal paper is Akerlof (1970), who draws on the market for used
cars to illustrate the problem caused by asymmetric information between dealers
and buyers. Later references include Jaffee and Russell (1976), Townsend (1979),
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Diamond (1984), among many others.
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way of understanding the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
This literature distinguishes among two subchannels, namely, the broad
credit channel and the bank lending channel, although more recent
interpretations of the role that banks play in the transmission of mon-
etary policy highlight the interaction between the two channels.3
This paper focuses on the bank lending channel, which empha-
sizes the role played by banks in the transmission of monetary policy.4
Thus, if the Central Bank follows a tight monetary policy, interbank
lending is curtailed and the supply of funds for banks drops. Some
individual banks might succeed in raising funds elsewhere, thus in-
sulating their loan portfolios against monetary policy. Other banks,
however, are forced to curtail their supply of credit, especially in the
face of a strong negative monetary shock. Such a decrease in the
bank loan supply is likely to be heterogeneous, as well, in the sense
that heavily indebted households and small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs), which are presumably bank dependent, are crowded
out of the market for bank loans and become severely financially
constrained.5 On the other hand, less binding adverse selection and
moral hazard problems allow large enterprises to maintain, if not
increase, their access to domestic bank loans and other domestic
3. See, for example, Huang (2003).
4. The broad credit channel (also known as the balance sheet channel) is
related to the supply of credit by all financial intermediaries, emphasizing the role
of asymmetric information in the existence of an external financing premium.
This premium is defined as the difference in the costs of external and internal
financing. The external financing premium depends negatively on the net worth
of a potential borrower and positively on the stance of monetary policy. Hence, it
is a financial accelerator mechanism that amplifies the effects of monetary policy
on investment and consumption decisions. See the appendix for an overview of
how both the broad credit channel and the bank lending channel are related to the
whole set of monetary transmission mechanisms.
5. Because of their comparative advantages in information collection and
processing, as well as their capacity to establish long-term relationships with their
clients, banks are the only ones able to offer credit to certain types of borrowers.
However, banks that serve clients without any other market alternative have to
deal with an asymmetric information problem, since it is difficult for the market to
value their loan portfolios. Those banks will therefore experience difficulties in
substituting their financial sources. For example, Goldberg, Cole, and White (2002),
using a survey on small firms conducted by the Federal Reserve, find that larger
banks rely on standard techniques based on financial statements to make their
commercial loan decisions. Smaller banks tend to deviate from these criteria,
supporting their decisions with a much more personalized assessment of the en-
trepreneurs (of SMEs). In other words, the role played by asymmetric informa-
tion is twofold: it affects the capacity of some banks to raise funds in situations of
low market liquidity, and it generates a set of captive clients among banks.The Bank Lending Channel in Chile 123
financial sources.6 As a result, the bank lending channel exacerbates
the impact of a negative monetary policy shock in aggregate spending.
In distinguishing between movements of the demand for and sup-
ply of bank credit —a key issue for interpreting the evidence on the
bank lending channel—we follow a strategy of identification through
heterogeneity, by comparing economic agents that are more likely to
be affected by financial frictions with economic agents that are less
likely to be so affected. In the words of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995),
“By observing and measuring the differential behavior of economic
agents under consideration, one can potentially attribute some, if
not all, of the difference in behavior to frictions caused by credit
markets.”
Although we are well aware that the asymmetric nature of finan-
cial frictions also implies time varying differences, that is, in and out
of times of tight monetary policy, we concentrate on explaining cross-
sectional differences by following a two-step approach. First, we fol-
low a panel data approach to test how bank characteristics (size,
liquidity, and capitalization) affect the response of loan supply after a
change in monetary policy. Second, using the evidence gathered in
the previous step regarding the main forces behind the bank lending
channel, we construct an aggregate variable—the low/high quality
ratio— aimed at capturing the availability of bank credit to house-
holds and SMEs vis-à-vis large enterprises. Using the low/high
quality ratio, we test—within a vector autoregression (VAR) system—
whether the bank lending channel exacerbates the effect of a mon-
etary policy shock over macroeconomic activity.
Our panel data approach is closely related to Hernando and
Martínez-Pagés (2001) and, to a lesser extent, to Kashyap and Stein
(1995, 2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000).7 Our VAR approach is
mainly related to Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995). Using this two-step
approach, we conclude that the bank lending channel operated as a
monetary policy transmission mechanism in Chile within the sample
period, having a significant impact on macroeconomic activity.
6. For example, if large firms are at the same time being directly affected by
an external shock that is restricting their access to international financial mar-
kets, they will satisfy their financial needs domestically, thereby further crowding
other agents out of financial markets. In addition to taking bank loans, large
Chilean enterprises have been actively issuing new domestic bonds in recent
periods.
7. See Cavieres (2002) for a study about the bank lending channel in Chile
that follows closely Kishan and Opiela (2000).124 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 1 describes
the data, section 2 examines some methodological issues and pre-
sents the empirical results, and section 3 concludes.
1. THE DATA
The data used in this paper come mainly from financial state-
ments of banks and publicly listed enterprises.8 Our dataset covers
the period from the first quarter of 1990 to the second quarter of
2002. We also make use of several macroeconomic series, which are
mostly taken from the Central Bank of Chile.
When using bank statements, we consider only banks that are
active participants in the credit market, excluding branches of foreign
banks that are mainly engaged in cash and portfolio management
activities.9 This diminishes the problems associated with heteroge-
neous demand shocks, because the share of different types of loans in
the banks’ portfolios does not differ significantly (see table 1). Even
after this adjustment, our dataset is quite representative of the credit
market, accounting for more than 90 percent of total loans at any
point in time (see figure 1).
From these bank statements we collect total loans, consumer
loans, and commercial loans. The distinction between consumer loans
and commercial loans points also toward a better identification of
movements in the supply of credit.10 Indeed, evidence indicates a dif-
ferential behavior of various types of loans during the business cycle
(see figure 2), which suggests that various types of loans may be af-
fected differently by demand shocks.
We also collect our proxies for bank characteristics—size, liquid-
ity, and capitalization—which are based on how the existing empirical
8. The bank statements are published in the statistical bulletin of the Super-
intendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF); the statements of publicly
listed enterprises are taken from a dataset assembled by the Santiago Stock Ex-
change  containing all the information provided by the Fecu (ficha estadística
codificada uniforme), a standardized statement that every listed company in Chile
is required to file quarterly.
9. When estimating the panel data, the original dataset is adjusted slightly to
take into account mergers that occurred during the sample period. We follow the
intermediate strategy proposed by Hernando and Martínez-Pagés (2001), gener-
ating a new bank when a merger of banks of similar size takes place. If the merger
is between banks of significantly different sizes, the data of the merged bank is
considered as data of the largest merging institution and no new bank appears.
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literature about the bank lending channel captures the potential prob-
lems associated with asymmetric information.11 Size is defined as the
bank’s share of the total assets of the banking system; liquidity is
defined as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets; and capitalization
is defined as the seasonally-adjusted ratio of capital and reserves to
total assets. Table 2 presents the main descriptive statistics on this
set of bank characteristics.
From the statements of publicly listed enterprises, we take the to-
tal large corporate sector bank debt. Using this variable as the denomi-
nator and the consumer loans of the banking system as the numerator,
11. See, for example, Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Kishan and Opiela
(2000).
Figure 2. Annual Growth of Total Loans, 1990 to 2002
Source: SBIF.
Figure 1. Share in the Loans Market of Banks Included
in the Sample, 1989 to 2002
Source: SBIF.The Bank Lending Channel in Chile 127
we construct a variable that we call the low/high quality ratio, to
capture the availability of bank credit to households and SMEs vis-à-
vis large enterprises. Two features of this ratio deserve further ex-
planation: the extent to which consumer loans capture not only
household credit but also loans directed to SMEs; and the relation of
this ratio to a flight to quality. With regard to the first feature, we
could have measured credit to SMEs more directly using data that is
available by loan size, but this series is only available since 1996, and
with less than quarterly frequency. However, when graphing the small
business loans and consumer loans together (see figure 3), the two
series follow a relatively similar path (the correlation is over 90 per-
cent). Credit to SMEs is, in fact, known to usually take the form of a
consumer credit in the Chilean banking industry, whereas credit to
large enterprises follows a very different path.
With regard to the second feature, our low/high quality ratio is
(inversely) related to the indicator of a flight to quality constructed
Figure 3. Small Loans and Consumption Loans
Source: SBIF.
Standard Percentile
Characteristic Mean  Error Minimum Maximum 25 50 75
Size 4.21 4.01 0.03 19.04 0.87 3.24 5.92
Liquidity 20.69 9.01 4.48 53.92 13.41 19.58 27.26
Capitalization 8.76 9.43 1.09 63.44 4.64 5.68 7.95
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Bank Characteristics
Source: Authors’ calculations.128 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
by Caballero (2002) using precisely the share of large loans from the
available data by loan size. Although our story is different from
Caballero’s, in the sense that we are trying to pin down the effect of a
monetary policy shock instead of an external shock, the operative
financial mechanism is basically the same: indebted consumers and
especially SMEs are crowded out of the banking system by large firms,
thus becoming severely financially constrained. Figure 4 shows a se-
vere flight-to-quality effect in 1998–99, a period of extremely tight
monetary policy.
To identify the effect of a monetary policy shock on the supply of
bank loans, we need an indicator that is closely tied to monetary
policy. The international empirical literature offers several alterna-
tives, but the set of choices in the case of Chile is limited by data
availability. Within this limited choice set, we choose the term spread,
defined as the difference between the monetary policy rate and the
PRC8.12 As explained in Gertler and Lown (2000), a positive move-
ment in the term spread (so defined) simply reflects that the mon-
etary tightening is inducing a fall in long-term rates, because there
are expectations of a drop in the short-term interest rate in the near
future (see figure 5).
12. The PRC8 are long-term indexed bonds issued by the Central Bank of
Chile. See Estrella and Mishkin (1998) for a positive assessment of the predictive
power of the term spread; see Gertler and Lown (2000) for an explanation of the
close relationship between the term spread and monetary policy, particularly in
periods of significant monetary tightening.
Figure 4. Annual Growth in Low/High Quality Ratio,
1992 to 2002
Source: Central Bank of Chile and authors’ calculations.The Bank Lending Channel in Chile 129
Finally, we use several macroeconomic series in the panel and
the VAR system. Specifically, in the panel of banks we use the annual
growth of real GDP to capture changes in income, and the annual
depreciation of the real exchange rate to capture movements in rela-
tive prices. Both variables are intended to control for demand effects.
In the VAR system, we use three additional endogenous variables
(besides the low/high quality ratio and the term spread): namely, a
proxy for macroeconomic activity (in logs and seasonally adjusted),
the consumer price index (in logs and seasonally adjusted), and the
real exchange rate (in logs). We use six different proxies for macro-
economic activity: real GDP, industrial production, business invest-
ment, durable goods consumption, unemployment rate, and residential
investment. In addition to these endogenous variables, every VAR
model includes the following set of exogenous variables: terms of trade,
inflation target, external output, and a time trend.13
2. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our main goal in this section is to analyze whether the bank
lending channel played any role as a transmission mechanism for
monetary policy in the Chilean economy during the period 1990 to
2002 and, if so, whether this transmission mechanism plays any
13. This is justified on the grounds that Chile is a small open economy with an
inflation target regime operating since the early 1990s. In particular, by including
the terms of trade, we are controlling for external shocks. Hence, if we find that
the low/high quality ratio influences economic activity following a monetary policy
shock, we can interpret the flight-to-quality effect as being domestically driven.
Figure 5. Term Spread, 1989 to 2002
Source: Central Bank of Chile.130 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
significant macroeconomic role. We follow a two-step approach. First,
we use a panel of bank data to identify shifts in the loan supply curve
in response to changes in monetary policy by exploiting the heteroge-
neity among banks. Such an exercise lets us gather evidence about
where the bank lending channel has operated most strongly. Second,
we use that knowledge to construct a variable that is likely to be a
good proxy of how the bank lending channel exacerbates the mon-
etary policy shock, thus having an independent and significant im-
pact on aggregate spending. This variable is the low/high quality ratio,
which captures the availability of bank credit to households and SMEs
vis-à-vis large enterprises. Here again, we appeal to heterogeneity
for identification purposes, this time among borrowers. Finally, we
embed the low/high quality ratio within a VAR system to test whether
the bank lending channel exacerbates the effect of a monetary policy
shock over macroeconomic activity.
2.1 First Step: A Panel Data of Banks
As discussed in the introduction, a tight monetary policy reduces
the amount of funds available for the banking system, and some banks
are unable to offset the reduction in interbank funds owing to informa-
tion problems. How do bank characteristics affect the response of loan
supply following a monetary policy shock? To answer this question, we
follow a panel data approach in which bank characteristics (size, li-
quidity, and capitalization) interact with the term spread (our indica-
tor of monetary policy) to disentangle the differential behavior of banks
with regard to total loans, consumer loans, and commercial loans.
In this panel model, the dynamic structure is adequately handled
by introducing one lag for the endogenous variable and four lags for
the term spread, the variables aimed at controlling for demand ef-
fects, and the variables related to bank characteristics. Although in-
cluding a lag of the dependent variable is trivial in the time-series
context, the fixed-effects estimator is severely biased in a dynamic
context. Instead of following the traditional approach to dealing with
such a problem—namely, the Arellano and Bond generalized method
of moments (GMM) procedure—we use the bias-corrected estimator
proposed by Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002).14
14. The Arellano and Bond GMM procedure is subject to substantial finite
sample bias, as shown by Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Hahn, Hausman,
and Kuersteiner (2002). For a more technical discussion of the methodological
issues, see Brock and Franken (2003).The Bank Lending Channel in Chile 131
The empirical specification within this panel data approach is the
following:
,
where yit represents the annual growth of total loans, commercial loans,
and consumer loans, respectively; xit is a vector of macroeconomic
variables aimed at controlling demand-side shocks (annual growth of
GDP and annual depreciation of the real exchange rate) in addition to
the monetary policy indicator (term spread); zit denotes a vector of
bank-specific variables (liquidity, size and capitalization); D is a set of
seasonal dummies; uit is i.i.d; i = 1, ... , N represents the number of
banks included in the dataset; and t = 1, ... , T is the time index from
1990:1 to 2002:2. Note that the bank-specific explanatory variables zit
are included with one lag to account for potential endogeneity.
We disentangle loan-supply from loan-demand effects by looking
at cross-sectional differences in the response of bank loans to a mon-
etary policy shock. Were these differences to be related to indicators
of the degree of informational asymmetries (size, liquidity, or capi-
talization), they would support the existence of the bank lending chan-
nel. More specifically, if the bank lending channel holds, we should
expect a positive and significant cross-coefficient between the term
spread and bank characteristics.
Table 3 shows the long-run coefficients for each of the explana-
tory variables. First, note that the long-run coefficient for the annual
growth of real GDP, when statistically significant, is positive. Sec-
ond, the long-run coefficient for annual real depreciation is always
significant and negative. Third, the long-run coefficient of the term
spread, which is positively related with a tighter monetary policy, is
always significant and negative. Finally, regarding the interaction of
bank characteristics with monetary policy, the results show that li-
quidity is always significant and positive, size is positive and signifi-
cant only for total loans, and capitalization is positive and significant
only for consumer loans.
Table 4 shows the overall effects of a tight monetary policy in terms
of the annual growth rate of total loans, consumer loans, and commer-
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15. The overall effects include the direct effect of monetary policy plus the
interactive effects of bank characteristics with monetary policy. If the parameter
is nonsignificant, it is computed as being equal to zero. Bank characteristics are
evaluated at three representative levels for each category.132 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
results in a larger drop in the growth rate of total loans for small
banks than for large banks.16  In addition, the drop in the growth rate
of all types of loans is larger for less liquid banks than for their more
liquid counterparts.17 In the case of consumer loans, the bank lend-
ing channel operates through less capitalized banks.18
Dependent variable Coefficient Standard error
1 Growth of total loans
Real GDP growth 0.57* 0.19
Real exchange rate devaluation –0.93* 0.11
Term spread –4.31* 0.46




2 Growth of consumer loans
Real GDP growth 1.09* 0.19
Real exchange rate devaluation –0.20** 0.10
Term spread –2.65* 0.57




3 Growth of commercial loans
Real GDP growth –0.02 0.37
Real exchange rate devaluation –1.71* 0.21
Term spread –6.85* 0.99
Bank characteristic and term spread:
Liquidity 13.59* 4.01
Size 2.22 4.21
 Capitalization –3.94 6.28
Table 3. Long-run Coefficients and Standard Errors
*Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
16. A one percentage point increase in the term spread accounts for an annual
reduction of 4.2 percent in total loans when the bank is small, but only 3.5 percent
when the bank is large.
17. A one percentage point increase in the term spread accounts for an annual
reduction of 3.3 percent in total loans, 1.8 percent in consumer loans, and 5.0
percent in commercial loans for a less liquid bank. On the other hand, a one
percentage point increase in the term spread accounts for an annual reduction of
only 2.2 percent in total loans, 0.9 percent in consumer loans, and 3.1 percent in
commercial loans for a highly liquid bank.
18. A one percentage point increase in the term spread accounts for an annual
reduction of 2.4 percent in consumer loans when the bank is less capitalized, but
only 2.2 percent when the bank is more capitalized.The Bank Lending Channel in Chile 133
Our preliminary results thus support the idea that the bank lend-
ing channel has operated in Chile. Furthermore, consumer loans
seems to better capture the role played by informational asymme-
tries in the response of bank loans to monetary policy shocks. In-
deed, both liquidity and capitalization have played a restrictive role
for consumer loans, while commercial loans have only been affected
by liquidity. We argued above that consumer loans are a reasonably
good proxy for bank credit directed to both households and SMEs.
Hence, our results in this first step suggest that the decrease in banks’
loan supply may have actually been heterogeneous, affecting more
SMEs and, to a lesser extent, highly indebted households, than large
enterprises. The next step concentrates on providing more solid evi-
dence along this line.
2.2 Second Step: A VAR System Including an
Aggregate Proxy for the Bank Lending Channel
The fact that the banks’ loan supply affects borrowers heteroge-
neously can be exploited to identify how the bank lending channel
exacerbates a monetary policy shock. We therefore construct the low/
high quality ratio to capture the availability of bank credit to house-
holds and SMEs vis-à-vis large enterprises.19 More specifically, we
ask the following question regarding the impact of monetary policy on
the real sector of the economy: does the bank lending channel play any
significant macroeconomic role as a monetary transmission mecha-
nism? To answer it, we analyze whether the low/high quality ratio has
marginal predictive power over a set of macroeconomic variables.
19. See section 1 for a more detailed explanation of this particular variable.
 Size Capitalization Liquidity
(percentile) (percentile) (percentile)
T y p e  o f  l o a n 2 55 07 5 2 55 07 5 2 5 5 07 5
Total –4.2 –3.9 –3.5 –4.3 –4.3 –4.3 –3.3 –2.8 –2.2
Consumer –2.6 –2.6 –2.6 –2.4 –2.3 –2.2 –1.8 –1.4 –0.9
Commercial –6.9 –6.9 –6.9  –6.9 –6.9 –6.9 –5.0 –4.2 –3.1
Table 4. Overall Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock on the
Growth Rate of Loans134 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
20. See footnote 5.
21. This is consistent with the international empirical evidence, which shows
that finding alternative sources of credit is quite difficult for SMEs.
22. The drop in the supply of bank credit pushes SMEs to curtail their produc-
tive activities, which are usually labor intensive. This has a strong impact in terms
of job destruction, since the affected workers are generally unskilled and thus
difficult to absorb into other sectors in the economy. Because increasing unem-
ployment rates are strongly correlated with consumer confidence (in the United
States and elsewhere), aggregate demand falls. Hancock and Wilcox (1998) find
that small banks engage in “high power” credit activities, with a small drop in their
credit supply having a large impact on economic activity, measured in terms of
unemployment, real wages, GDP, and number of bankruptcies.
23. We use a two-step procedure to define the optimal lag structure (Johansen,
1995): the first step uses the Schwarz-Bayesian criterion; the second step adds
additional lags for eliminating any evidence of serial correlation detected by the
multivariate LM test statistics for residual serial correlation.
We expect a negative monetary policy shock to reduce the low/
high quality ratio (flight to quality), which would strongly affect bank-
dependent households and SMEs by eliminating their only source of
external funding.20 For example, casual evidence for the Chilean
economy shows that SMEs have quite limited access, if any, to bond
issuing or capital raising in the stock market.21 In other words, the
decline in the low/high quality ratio represents a decrease in portion
of the banks’ loan supply directed to those economic agents (house-
holds and SMEs) who bear the largest share of the costs associated
with information problems. This may, in turn, have a significant ef-
fect on economic activity.22
The empirical approach used in this section consists in estimat-
ing a set of VAR models in levels, each of which includes the low/high
quality ratio that accounts for the existence of the bank lending chan-
nel. Four endogenous variables are also included, namely, the term
spread as the indicator of the monetary policy stance, a proxy for
macroeconomic activity (with six different alternatives), the real ex-
change rate, and the price level. Finally, every model includes a set
of exogenous variables: terms of trade, inflation target, external out-
put, and a time trend.23
To assess the macroeconomic importance of the bank lending chan-
nel, we test for the marginal predictive power of the credit variable
(low/high quality ratio) by carrying out Granger causality tests and
reporting the corresponding p values. A rejection of the null hypoth-
esis that the credit variable is irrelevant for predicting macroeconomic
activity is one piece of evidence in favor of the bank lending channel.
This evidence has to be complemented with two simultaneousThe Bank Lending Channel in Chile 135
conditions, however: rejection of the null hypothesis that the term
spread is irrelevant for predicting the credit variable, and failure to
reject the null hypothesis that the proxy for macroeconomic activity
is useless in predicting the credit variable. In other words, the bank
lending channel requires that lagged values of the term spread be
significant in predicting the credit variable, which in turn must be
significant in predicting either macroeconomic activity or other
macroeconomic variables.
Table 5 shows the Granger causality test for each VAR model.
The results support the hypothesis that the low/high quality ratio
Table 5. VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity
Wald Testsa
P values from exclusion test
a. This table shows the results obtained from six VAR models. Each one uses a different option for measuring
macroeconomic activity: real GDP, industrial production, business investment, durable consumption, the
unemployment rate, and residential investment. Each proxy is added one at a time to the base VAR. The base
model comprises five variables: real GDP, the consumer price index, the term spread, the low/high quality mix
ratio, and the real exchange rate. The exogenous variables are the terms of trade, the inflation target, external
output, and a time trend.
b. The numbers in the table are the p values for the null hypothesis that some variables contain no information
for the dependent variable. For each model, we choose the equations that represent both the proxy for
macroeconomic activity and the credit variable (low/high quality mix ratio). We then test, respectively, whether
the term spread and the credit variables do not Granger cause  macroeconomic activity and whether macroeconomic
activity and monetary policy do not Granger cause the credit variable. In other words, if the p value is lower than
5 percent, we can reject the null hypothesis.
c. Ratio of credit bank loans for consumer and small firms to short-term bank debt of all firms, from Fecu dataset.
d. The exogenous variables are a time trend, the inflation target, the terms of trade, and external output.
e. Endogenous variables have two lags; exogenous variables have two lags.
f. Endogenous variables have three lags; exogenous variables have two lags.
  Low/high quality mix ratiob, c, d
Models classified Variables excluded from:
according to proxies for Macroeconomic P values Low/high quality P values
macroeconomic activity activity equation (percent)  mix ratio equation (percent)
GDPe Monetary policy shock 95.6 GDP 73.6
  Low/high quality mix ratio 0.0 Monetary policy shock 0.2
Industrial productione Monetary policy shock 4.5 Industrial production 90.7
  Low/high quality mix ratio 0.5 Monetary policy shock 0.6
Business investmente Monetary policy shock 68.7 Business investment 66.5
  Low/high quality mix ratio 0.0 Monetary policy shock 0.2
Durable consumptionf Monetary policy shock 0.2 Durable consumption 52.6
  Low/high quality mix ratio 1.9 Monetary policy shock 3.3
Unemployment ratee Monetary policy shock 44.7 Unemployment 95.6
  Low/high quality mix ratio 0.0 Monetary policy shock 0.8
Residential investmentf Monetary policy shock 3.1 Residential investment 55.4
  Low/high quality mix ratio 1.9 Monetary policy shock 2.5136 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
predicts macroeconomic variables in all cases. These results also
indicate that the lags of the term spread are significant for predicting
macroeconomic variables in just three out of six cases.24 On the other
hand, macroeconomic variables are not helpful for predicting the low/
high quality ratio in each case, whereas the term spread is helpful for
predicting the low/high quality ratio in all cases. The empirical evi-
dence thus strongly supports a causality running from monetary policy
to credit and from credit to macroeconomic activity.
To study the dynamics of the bank lending channel, we estimate
a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) and report impulse re-
sponses to a monetary policy shock. The set of identifying assump-
tions is borrowed from a vast list of authors who use this type of
identification scheme in VAR models.25 Variables are thus divided
into three recursive sets: nonpolicy variables that are not contempo-
raneously affected by the policy variables; policy variables; and
nonpolicy variables that are contemporaneously affected by the policy
variables.26 In other words, the Central Bank’s feedback rule is iden-
tified by dividing the set of nonpolicy variables into variables that
cause a policy reaction and variables that are affected by the policy
reaction. For the policy variables, we assume the following sequence
of events: the Central Bank first sets an inflation target, which is an
exogenous variable, and it then sets the monetary policy stance.27
For the nonpolicy variables, we assume a recursive causal relation-
ship ordered as follows: price level, output, and the credit variable.28
Our positioning of the variable used as a proxy for the bank lending
channel (low/high quality ratio) in last place is based on the assump-
tion that the Central Bank is able to affect it contemporaneously
24. At the 5 percent level of significance.
25. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996, 1997, 1999);
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995); Strogin (1995); Bernanke and Blinder (1992);
Bernanke and Mihov (1998); and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). For the case of
Chile, see Bravo and García (2002).
26. In our particular case, we use an exactly identified VAR because addi-
tional identifying restrictions in the parameters do not change the results ob-
tained in the impulse response functions.
27. This assumption is consistent with the fact that the monetary policy rate
is used as a fine-tuning policy, given a known inflation target.
28. The assumption behind this order is that the price level is stickier than
output, a fact that is consistent with the high level of backward indexation in the
Chilean economy (Jadresic, 1996).The Bank Lending Channel in Chile 137
through the monetary policy stance, since capital markets tend to
respond faster than goods and labor markets.29
Figure 6 displays the estimated impulse responses (black lines).
The low/high quality ratio decreases following the monetary policy shock,
a result that is consistent with a flight-to-quality effect as described
above. GDP declines about two quarters after a tightening in monetary
policy. The maximum decline occurs about a year after the shock, and
the effect gradually dies out thereafter. We observe a similar pattern
when GDP is substituted by industrial production or unemployment
rate, although the effect seems to be more persistent in the latter case.
When both investment and durable consumption replace GDP,
these two components of aggregate output decline during the first
year and a half. Such a result differs from the international empirical
evidence. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) find evidence
that in the United States the decline of durable consumption and
residential investment precede business fixed investment. Their in-
terpretation is against the conventional monetary policy transmis-
sion mechanism that operates through an earlier decline in
investment. In the Chilean case, however, the impulse responses in-
dicate that durable consumption and both types of investment de-
crease at approximately the same time. We interpret this as evidence
that both transmission mechanisms are relevant for Chile.
The empirical strategy described above allows us to compare the
impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in two different sys-
tems, in which the variable used as a proxy for the bank lending
channel (i.e. the low/high quality ratio) is first defined as endogenous
(black lines) and then as exogenous (gray lines). Shutting down the
bank lending channel effect on other macroeconomic variables fol-
lowing a monetary policy shock establishes a measure of the macro-
economic relevance of the bank lending channel: namely, the difference
between the two impulse responses.30 To determine whether this
29. To illustrate the identifying assumptions described above, assume that the
Central Bank contemporaneously knows the evolution of the inflation rate but is
not able to affect it. If the economy faces an inflationary shock (an oil shock, for
instance), the Central Bank could respond with a change in the monetary policy
rate. This, in turn, would have an immediate impact on other variables, such as
the low/high quality ratio and the exchange rate. Only then might monetary
policy affect variables such as GDP, investment, consumption, and inflation.
30. From the Granger causality tests, we already know that the empirical
evidence strongly supports a causality running from monetary policy to credit and
from credit to macroeconomic activity. What we are doing here, therefore, is
determining whether the flight-to-quality effect occurs as a result of a monetary
policy shock or is driven by other factors.138 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
difference is statistically significant, we display the dashed lines that
represent a 95 percent confidence interval for each impulse response
function when the bank lending channel is endogenous. If the im-
pulse response functions calculated under the assumption that the
credit variable is exogenous fall outside this confidence interval, we
interpret this as evidence in favor of the macroeconomic relevance of
the bank lending channel.
What do we find? The bank lending channel is unambiguously rel-
evant in terms of GDP, business investment, and the unemployment
rate, since the responses of these variables are definitely much weaker
if the proxy for the bank lending channel is exogenously included in
Figure 6. Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
on Monetary Policy Shocka (quarters)
Low/High Quality Mix Ratio GDP
Industrial Production Business Investment
Percent Percent
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the system. The other results also support the macroeconomic rel-
evance of the bank lending channel to a degree, since durable con-
sumption, residential investment, and industrial production are on
the brink of being statistically different from the case of an endog-
enous bank lending channel.31
Figure 6. (continued)




31. We are using a relatively small dataset given the relatively large set of
variables included in the VAR system, meaning that we are dealing with large
sampling uncertainty. The 95 percent confident interval is thus a rather strict test.
For instance, researchers tend to use +/-1 standard deviation when dealing with
large sampling uncertainty, meaning that a 67 percent confidence interval for the
true impulse response function is considered good enough for the purpose at hand
(see, for example, Stock and Watson, 2001). If we use the latter benchmark, the
macroeconomic relevance of the bank lending channel is unambiguously sup-
ported for all variables used as proxies for macroeconomic activity.140 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
We conclude that the bank lending channel operated as a mon-
etary policy transmission mechanism in Chile during the period 1990–
2002, with an independent and significant effect in terms of
macroeconomic activity. The way that the bank lending channel seems
to have operated in Chile is consistent with the international empiri-
cal evidence: first, some banks—less liquid banks and, to a lesser ex-
tent, small and less capitalized banks—are forced to curtail their supply
of credit following a monetary policy shock; second, the access of house-
holds and SMEs to external financing is severely restricted following
the drop in the supply of bank credit; third, the uneven distribution of
the drop in the supply of bank credit, which can be associated to a
flight-to-quality effect, has a significant influence in terms of macro-
economic activity. By pushing toward a better understanding of the
way in which the bank lending channel operates as a transmission
mechanism of monetary policy in Chile, our paper contributes to an
improvement of the monetary policy decision framework.
Our focus in this paper is on explaining cross-sectional differences
among economic agents (banks, firms, and, to a lesser extent, house-
holds). The evidence gathered in this paper therefore points toward a
bank lending channel operating across the sample period, abstract-
ing from the asymmetries related to times in and out of tight mon-
etary policy and from the evolution of certain features in the economy
that may affect the strength of the bank lending channel. For ex-
ample, information problems are likely to be less binding in periods
of relatively loose monetary policy, rendering the bank lending chan-
nel much less relevant as a transmission mechanism in comparison
with periods of a tighter monetary stance. In particular, the large
monetary policy shock in 1998–99 probably represents the bank lend-
ing channel operating at its maximum strength, although the
counterfactual exercise of what would have happened had the ex-
change rate been allowed to depreciate sharply points to the possibil-
ity of a financial accelerator mechanism as well, through larger balance
sheet effects. Another example is the role played by the increase in
the capital base of banks during the 1990s, as well as the more wide-
spread use of credit scoring. Both trends have probably strengthened
the capacity of banks to deal with informational asymmetries.
This study underscores at least four avenues for future research
that may deepen our knowledge of the functioning of the creditThe Bank Lending Channel in Chile 141
channel, in general, and the bank lending channel, in particular, as
transmission mechanisms for the monetary policy in the Chilean
economy: (i) improvements in measuring the monetary policy shock;
(ii) improvements in measuring the costs for bank-dependent bor-
rowers associated with a drop in banks’ credit supply; (iii) improve-
ments in incorporating the effects of policy changes and financial sector
developments; and (iv) improvements in assembling more compre-
hensive datasets at the microeconomic level.142 R. Alfaro, H. Franken, C. García, and A. Jara
APPENDIX
Subchannels of Monetary Transmission
The different transmission mechanisms of monetary policy can be
illustrated by means of the diagram in figure A1 (Kuttner and Mosser,
2002). The transmission mechanism process begins with the Central
Bank’s definition of a monetary policy rate. The interbank rate then
converges to this objective through the regulation of the liquidity of
the financial system. Once the liquidity of the financial system is ad-
justed, different mechanisms start operating in the transmission chan-
nel. Four of these are activated by market interest rates moving in
tandem with the interbank interest rate. These are the interest rate
channel, in which an increase in the cost of capital reduces the domes-
tic aggregate demand through a fall in investment and in the con-
sumption of durable goods; the exchange rate channel (in open
economies), which operates through the effect of the uncovered inter-
est rate parity on net imports; the asset price channel (stocks, bonds,
and real estate), which generates a wealth effect that has an impact on
consumers’ decisions; and the broad credit channel, which is also re-
lated to the market value of assets and which is described in the intro-
duction. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy does not end
there, however. It is possible to distinguish two additional channels,
namely, the monetarist channel related to changes in relative asset
prices and the bank lending channel, the main issue of our paper.
Figure A1. Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission
Source: Kuttner and Mosser (2002).The Bank Lending Channel in Chile 143
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